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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78A-3-102Q) (2008).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly apply the statute of limitations, which by its clear
and unambiguous language applies to the State, to prevent the State from
challenging a conveyance it made nearly a century ago?

2.

Is the State's claim to the Property precluded by the 1927 Jones Act and
operation of the after-acquired title doctrine?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the trial court's conclusions of law
are reviewed for "correctness." Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, ^ 9, 57 P.3d 1007,
1012.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The state of Utah, acting by and through the School & Institutional Trust Lands
Administration (hereinafter the "State" or "SITLA"), claims title to a section of land,
which it sold and conveyed by patent almost a century ago (the "Mathis Property").
In 1912, the State issued a Patent conveying fee title to the Mathis Property to
Carbon County Land Company ("CCLC"). It was subsequently determined through
administrative proceedings instituted by the United States Department of Interior (the
1

"Department") that the State did not hold title to the Mathis Property when it issued its
Patent because the land was of "known mineral character" at the time of Utah's
statehood. That all changed, however, on January 25,1927, when Congress passed the
Jones Act. The Jones Act passed to the states title to all sections of school land that had
been previously adjudicated by the Department to be of known mineral character,
including the Mathis Property. Any lingering questions about the effect of the Jones Act
on prior conveyances of school trust lands of known mineral character were rendered
completely moot when Congress passed a retroactive amendment to the Jones Act in
1932.
With the passage of the Jones Act in January 1927, the State received title to the
Mathis Property, which, by operation of Utah's after-acquired title law, immediately
inured to its prior patentee, CCLC. When CCLC failed to pay property taxes that year,
the Mathis Property was sold by the county at a tax sale. In May 1938, Carbon County
sold and conveyed the Property to Rex H. Mathis. Since 1938, Rex Mathis and his
family have leased the mineral estate, entered into oil and gas leases, paid taxes and, in
all ways, openly exercised ownership of the Mathis Property.
In 2004, the State brought the instant case as a "test case" to attempt to recover
land that it had conveyed almost a century ago. In its complaint, the State alleges that
prior to January 25, 1927, the State of Utah did not have title to the Property, and, as a
result, no title passed to CCLC as a result of its 1912 Patent. The State's complaint
further alleges that at the time the State received title pursuant to the Jones Act on

2

January 25, 1927, the mineral estate of the Property was reserved in the State and could
not be conveyed or pass by operation of law. [R. 000191.]
Both the Mathis Defendants and the State cross-moved for summary judgment
before the District Court. The District Court granted the Mathis Defendants9 motion
finding the State was precluded by operation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-2 (2007)1 from
challenging its own nearly century old conveyance. [See Order and Final Judgment; see
Addendum Tab F.]
STATEMENT OF FACTS
SITLA is a statutory successor to the State Board of Land Commissioners, the
Utah State Land Board, and the Utah Division of State Land and Forestry. [R. 000639
000640-000641.]
The State's Sale of the Mathis Property
On or about February 1, 1905, Clarence B. Milner entered into an agreement with
the State of Utah to purchase Section 36, Township 12 South Range 10 East, Salt Lake
Base & Meridian (the "Mathis Property") from the State. [R. 000019.] After receiving a
series of annual purchase payments, the State conveyed fee simple title to the Property
through a land Patent (hereinafter the "Patent") issued to the CCLC on February 28,
1912. [R. 000021; see Addendum Tab D.] In relevant part, the Patent provides:
Now, Therefore, I, William Spry, Governor, in consideration of the
premises, and by virtue of the power and authority vested in me by
the laws of the State of Utah, in such case made and provided, do
1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-2 (2007) was recently amended and renumbered as Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-2-201 (2008).
3

issue this PATENT, in the name and by the authority of the State of
Utah, hereby granting and confirming unto the said Carbon County
Land Company, a corporation and its successors and assigns forever,
the following piece or parcel of land, situate in the County of Carbon
State aforesaid, to wit: All of Section Thirty-six (36) in Township
Twelve (12) South Range Ten (10) East, and all of Section Thirtytwo (32) in Township (12) South Range Eleven (11) East of the Salt
Lake Meridian containing Twelve Hundred & Eighty (1280) acres
according to the said certificate To Have and to Hold the above
described and granted premises unto the said Carbon County Land
Company -a corporation- and its successors and assigns forever,
subject to any easement or right of way of the public, to use all such
highways as may have been established according to law,....
Al Hit1 time (lie Nliilr n>n\TYul Hit1 IVhllih PtoptTH, find Ini s n t i a i voars thrroaftn,

nothing required the State to reserve in itself mineral interests and it did not make any
such reservation in the sale and conveyance documents relating to the Property. [R
000639, 000642,]
Although many enabling acts expressly excluded mineral lands from their grants
to the states, Utah's enabling act neither included or excluded known mineral lands.
Jensen v. Dinehart, 645 I > 2d 32, 3 4 (1 Jtah 1982) However, in 1918, the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563 (1918), held that as a matter of
governmental policy, Congress's school land grant did not pass title to lands that were
"known to have been mineral in character" at I Jtah's statehood, despite the fact that
Utah's enabling act contained no reservation language. Arising out of and consistent
with the Sweet ruling, there was considerable administrative litigation with respect to
titles to school lands in various western states. See Jensen, 645 P.2d at 34.
The Department of Interior s Administrative Proceedings
The standard for determining whether land was of known mineral character
4

changed significantly between the time the original survey of the Mathis Property was
performed in 1895, which determined it was "not of mineral character," and 1926 when
the Department made findings that the land was of mineral character. Until the 1911
decision in United States v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 191 F. 786 (8th Cir. 1911), it was
generally accepted that exposure of commercially valuable coal was essential to
classifying lands as mineral in character. See United States v. Carbon County Land Co.,
46 F.2d 980, 982 (10th Cir. 1931). In fact, "[a] rule promulgated by the Commissioner of
the General Land Office and decisions of the Land Office were to that affect." Id. With
the decision of Diamond Coal & Coke Company, however, the rules changed so that the
mineral character of land could "be established by any satisfactory evidence, including
geologic inference." Id. With the more liberal standard came new reviews of original
surveys.
On June 27,1924, the United States Department of Interior General Land Office
ordered administrative proceedings for a formal determination of the mineral character of
a number of sections of land in Carbon County, Utah, including the Mathis Property. [R.
000023-000037.] SITLA's predecessor, the State Land Board, filed an answer and
participated in the Department's administrative proceedings along with CCLC. [R.
0000650.] On September 4, 1926, the General Land Office recommended to the
Secretary of the Interior that the State's claim to the Property be denied because it was of
"known mineral character" at the time of Utah's statehood. [R. 000059-000114.]
The Department recognized during its proceedings in 1926 that, as to the Mathis
Property, "[t]here are no exposures of coal on the land, the nearest being at the Hillburn
5

niiiir in SIT, i 1, about 1 " / niiU*s south' ami that iiiiy nial Ihal uouhl polnitnilH UIHICIIH1
the section would be "at an estimated depth of 3100 feet" [R. 000408.] Given the lack
of exposure of commercially valuable coal, it is not surprising that original survey
accepted in 1895 determined that the Mathis I 'roperty was not of mineral character.
On September 8,1926, the Secretary of the Interior upheld the General Land
Office's recommendation regarding the mineral character of the Mathis Property. [F!
000114-000115.] With the Secretary of Interior's September 8, 1926 ruling, the Property
was deemed nevei to ha ve passed to the State. ' I 'he consequence: A eloi id of title
uncertainty enveloped school lands everywhere rendering them practically valueless. [R.
000658.]
rj(^

j^27 Jones Act and After-Acquired Title
On January 25,1927, the United States Congress passes the Jones Act. Under the

Jones Act, title to all school lands, regardless of their mineral character, immediately

that had not yet been conveyed. [Act of January 25,1927, Ch. 57, § 1,44 Stat. 1026,
{codified as amended 43 U.S.C §§ 870-71); see Addendum Tab B.] At the time the State
received title to the Propei t;> undei the Jones Act, 1 Jtah statutorily i ecognized the doctrine
of after-acquired title. [See Utah Compiled Laws § 4879 (1917).]
Although there were varying interpretations of the Jones Act with respect to its
application to school lands already conveyed by the various states, Plaintiffs
predecessor, u> ^ r

•*.'••-.

101 Utah, took the position in 1929 that any title vested

in the State pursuant to the Jones Act automatically vested in the State's prior grantees by
6

application of the doctrine of estoppel by deed or after-acquired title. [R. 000660000662.] That State Land Board further acknowledged in 1929 that the Jones Act's
prohibitions on the transfer of minerals only applied to "sales and transfers after the
passage of the [Jones] Act, and does not affect grants where the title passes from the State
by virtue of its prior patent." [Id.] (emphasis added). The State's position on the issue
was in conflict with that of the Department spurring further Congressional action.
Congress Amends the Jones Act
In 1932, Congress retroactively amended the Jones Act by adding nine additional
words (shown in bold below) to clarify that its prohibition on the transfer of minerals in
school lands only applied to conveyances made subsequent to the Jones Act. As
amended, subsection (b) provided:
The additional grant made by this Act is upon the express
condition that all sales, grants, deeds, or patents for any of the
lands so granted shall hereafter be subject to and contain a
reservation to the State of all the coal and other minerals in
the lands so sold, granted, deeded, or patented, together with
the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same. The
coal and other mineral deposits in such lands not heretofore
disposed of by the State shall be subject to lease by the State
as the State legislature may direct, the proceeds and rentals
and royalties therefrom to be utilized for the support or in aid
of the common or public schools: Provided, That any lands or
minerals hereafter disposed of contrary to the provisions of
this Act shall be forfeited to the United States by appropriate
proceedings instituted by the Attorney General for that
purpose in the United States district court for the district in
which the property or some part thereof is located.
[See Act of May 2, 1932, 47 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 870); see
Addendum Tab C ]

7

Subsequent Ownership and I Jse of the Mathis Property b> the Mathis
Defendants
On December 21,1927, the Carbon County Treasurer issued a Certificate of Sale
making a ptt'litiuiut v *uk- ol llit 1'iopeilv lu < "aibon I'ounty because CCI C failed to pay
property taxes for the year 1927. [R. 000307.] On December 2 1 , 1 9 3 1 , the Carbon
County Clerk and Auditor issued an Auditor's Tax Deed conveying the Property to
Carbon County, the Property having been unredeemed after the tax sale. [R. 000307.]
Subsequently, on May 3, 1938, Carbon Coi if it:) sold and conveyed the Pi opei try to Rex I I
Mathis. [R. 000478.]
Since 1938, Appellees have leased the mineral estate, entered into oil and gas

[R. 000667,000670-000672.] On July 1 2 , 1 9 7 2 , Rex H. Mathis died intestate in Carbon
County, Utah. [See R. 000674.] On May 2 2 , 1 9 7 3 , a Waiver of Lien executed by the
Utah State 1 :n ('onmiission was r a ni'dcel in the ("ailion 1 "-• mnty Recorder's ( HTict;,
wherein the State waived any and all claims to a lien for inheritance taxes due to the State
from the estate of Rex Mathis in regards to the Mathis Property. [R. 000681-000682.]
On July 16, 19 73, the District Coi it t of Carbon Count> entered a Decree of Distribution
in connection with the estate of Rex H. Mathis. [R. 000674-000679.] Pursuant to the
Decree of Distribution, the Mathis Property was conveyed to Dora Dean Mathis. [Id.]
Through mesne conveyances of record, title to the Mathis Property is currently vested in
Mathis Land, Inc., Mountain Mineral Resources, LLC and Buck Creek, LLC. [R.
000667, 000668-000669.]

8

The Mathis Property is Leased to Andalex Resources
In January 1998, Mathis Land, Inc., Rex Morrell Mathis, JoAnn L. Mathis Ross,
William Dale Mathis, Marc Pickup and Shawnda Pickup Cave entered into an
Underground Coal Lease agreement on the Property with Andalex Resources, Inc.
("Andalex"). [R. 000500-000524.] In early 2004, subsequent to the execution of the
Underground Coal Lease, the State indicated that it intended to challenge the ownership
interests of the lessors under the Underground Coal Lease. In response, Andalex entered
into a lease for coal with the State dated effective as of March 1,2004. [R. 000480000498.]
On or about November 6,2002, the State retained Jones Lease Service to examine
the records of the Bureau of Land Management at its Salt Lake City office, and the
records of the Carbon County Recorder in Price, Utah as those records pertained to the
Mathis Property. [R. 000639, 000643.] A Status Report provided to SITLA by Jones
Lease Service dated November 6,2002, indicated that the Mathis Property was in private
and not state ownership. [R. 000639, 000644.] On January 15, 2004, John Andrews,
Associate Director of SITLA, gave a report to the SITLA5 s Board. In the report, Mr.
Andrews indicated that the State had been researching for a number of years some of the
disposition of lands out of State ownership that were coal lands sold without mineral
reservations and that the State had been looking for a good "test case" to try to recover
some of the lands. [R. 000689-000692.]

9

90 Years Later, the State First Asserts Ownership of the Mathis Property in a "Test
Case"
By letter dated February 3,2004 to William Dale Mathis and Rex Morrill Mathis,
SITLA, for the first time, and more than 90 years after the State issued its Patent in 1912,

March 18, 2004, SITLA, in a closed session board meeting, determined that it should
consider taking legal action to recover possession of the Mathis Property which was sold

14, 2005, SITLA filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to the mineral estate of the
Mathis Property and a claim for an accounting of the proceeds received from mining
activities occurring on the Mathis Property

000001 -000013 ] Subsequently, on

November 23, 2005, SITI A sought h • c irom the trial ecu it It to file an Amended
Complaint, again asserting claims for quiet title and accounting for proceeds. [R.00031200313; R. 000181-000194.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED SECTION 78-12-2 IN THIS CASE.

The trial court correctly held that the State's challenge to its own 1912 conveyance

challenge to the trial court's application of Section 78-12-2, the State mistakenly
contends that in light of Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 199 P. 670 (Utah 1921), it is

from suing to recover property that it conveyed by patent nearly a century ago. For good
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reason, this argument was squarely rejected by the trial court and should be rejected on
here.
The simple question at issue in Van Wagoner was whether one could adversely
possess school trust lands as against the State in order to destroy the State's title to a
piece of school trust property. In essence, the State's involvement in Van Wagoner was
that of merely defending title to property it previously conveyed by patent from a claim
of adverse possession. On this issue, the Court sided with the State holding that "[t]he
plea of the statutes of limitations and the claim of title by adverse possession should not
prevail." Id. at 676. The case at hand, however, has nothing to do with adverse
possession and is therefore unlike Van Wagoner.
Contrary to the State's assertions, the trial court did not simply "disregard" Van
Wagoner to apply an appellate decision less-favorable to the State. Rather, the trial court
correctly found that Van Wagoner was "distinguishable from the instant case" because no
one in this case is seeking to establish title against the State by claims of adverse
possession. [SeeR. 001135-001138; Addendum Tab F.] Furthermore, to apply
VanWagoner as urged by the State, the trial court would have been forced to ignore the
recent decisions reached in Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and
Forestry, 884 P.2d 1265 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Trail Mountain /"), and Trail Mountain
Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1996) ("Trail
Mountain IF'), which concluded that Section 78-12-2 does in fact apply to the State, even
when the State is acting as a trustee of public school lands. See Trail Mountain It 884
P.2d at 1271 (noting that although "states are generally exempt form the applicable
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statute of limitations when acting in their capacity as school land trustee,... an exception
to the general rule is triggered when the state itself, through its legislature, makes the
statute of limitation applicable to the state.")
Here, a plain reading of the unambiguous language of Section 78-12-2 bars the

purports to be acting in its capacity as trustee. Notably, the State was also acting in its
capacity as trustee when it originally sold and conveyed the Property in 1912, and when it

it expressly affirmed its earlier conveyances. It would, therefore, be inequitable to allow
the State to now bring an action to recover the property it conveyed almost a century ago
merely because the • State believes that it Is now "ti tily" acting in its 'Capacity as trustee in
seeking to recover what now asserts to be "full value"forthe Mathis Property. When the
State itself, through its legislature, makes the statute of limitation applicable to the State,
the cry of the State seeking to be the exception to the rule rings hollow.
2t

THE AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE DIMJTKIJNE, TOGETHER WITH THE JONES ACT,
VESTED TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN CARBON COUNTY LAND COMPANY ON
JANUARY 25,1927.

Although the trial court properly applied Section 78 12-2 to bar the State's action,

relied on some other ground." DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995).
Accordingly, the trial court's decision can be affirmed by proper interpretation of the
Jones Act and application of the aftei acqi ill eel title docti ii ie.
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In 1912, the State issued a Patent conveying fee title to the Mathis Property to
CCLC. It was subsequently determined through administrative proceedings instituted by
the United States Department of Interior (the "Department") that the State did not receive
title to the Property because it was of "known mineral character" at the time of Utah's
statehood. However, on January 25,1927, Congress passed what later became known as
the Jones Act which operated to pass title to all sections of school land that had been
previously adjudicated by the Department to be of known mineral character, including
the Mathis Property at issue here, to the states. Although there was some dispute as to
the proper interpretation of the Jones Act and its provisions that restricted states from
transferring mineral interests, such disputes were rendered moot when Congress
retroactively amended the Jones Act in 1932 to clarify that its restrictions against the
transfer of mineral lands applied only to conveyances made by the State's after January
25,1927.
With the passage of the Jones Act on January 25,1927, the State received title to
the Property, which, by operation of Utah's after-acquired title law, immediately inured
to its prior patentee, CCLC. The State has attempted to skirt by the after-acquired title
doctrine by arguing that it does not apply to patents. This position is not only
inconsistent with the position taken by the State at the time of the Jones Act, it is also
inconsistent with the Jones Act and the language of the Patent itself.
Because of the after-acquired title doctrine, CCLC was the owner of the Mathis
Property as of January 25, 1997. CCLC failed to pay taxes on the Property that year,
however, and the Mathis Property was sold by Carbon County at a tax sale.
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Subsequently, in May of 1938, Carbon County sold and conveyed the Property to Rex H.
Mathis. Since 1938, Rex Mathis and his family have leased the mineral estate, eiiteied
into oil and gas leases, paid taxes and, in all ways, openly exercised ownership of the
Mathis Property.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-2 To
PRECLUDE THE STATE FROM CHALLENGING ITS NEARLY CENTURY OLD
CONVEYANCE.

- ;• In essence, the State's action is based oi I the contei ition that pi ioi to Januai y 25,
1927, the State of Utah did not have title to the Property, and, as a result, no title passed
to CCLC as a result of its 1912 Patent. The State's complaint further alleges that at the
time the Slate received Utle pursuant to the Jones Act on January 2 \ 192 7, the mineral
estate of the Property was reserved in the State and could not be conveyed, m pass by
operation of law. [R. 000191.] Although not mentioned in its complaint, the State now
contends that Section 78 12 2 cannot be applied against it to prevent it "from suing to

"[amplication of the statute of limitations here would preclude the State, in its capacity as
trustee, from recovering a valuable asset wrongly divested from the school trust through a
void tax sale."

[Appellant's Brief, p 19 ] It I c thei w oi ds, the State no^ \* ants the

chance to challenge its own actions and the price it received in exchange for its
conveyance of the Mathis Property more than 90 years ago.
Despite the State's contention thai il look title to tL Mithis IVopntv in hritiith
1927 as a result of the Jones Act, the State brought no action to assert its alleged

ownership until 2004. Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that the State's
action is time-barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-2 which provides:
Actions by the state. The state will not sue any person for or in respect to
any real property, or issues or profits thereof, by reason of the right or title
of the state to the same, unless:
(1)
such right or title shall have accrued within seven years before
any action or other proceeding for the same shall be commenced;
or
(2)
the state or those from whom it claims shall have received the
rents and profits of such real property, or some thereof, within
seven years.
The State now seeks a reversal of the trial court's order to open the way for it to
challenge its conveyance. For at least two reasons, the State's arguments cannot prevail.
First, Section 78-12-2 has been applied to the State in its fiduciary capacity previously
and there is no reason not to apply it in this case. Second, none of the cases cited by the
State support the proposition that the State may challenge the amount of consideration it
received in exchange for a conveyance of property nearly a century ago.
A.

Other cases have applied the statute of limitations to the State.

The State contends that Section 78-12-2 cannot be applied to it when it is acting in
a fiduciary capacity. Section 78-12-2, however, has been applied to the State in its
fiduciary capacity previously and there is no reason not to apply it in this case. In Trail
Mountain II, 921 P.2d 1365, for instance, the Court held that the seven year period of
Section 78-12-2 applied to a claim by the State's predecessor to recover royalty payments
under a State mining lease rather than a six year statute of limitations for written
contracts in Section 78-12-23. It stated:
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A plain reading of the statute reveals that it applies to actions brought by
the state as a consequence of the state's claim of right to real property or
issues or profits derived from real property. If, as [plaintiff] claims, the
statute were limited to adverse possession claims, the language "or the
issues or profits thereof would be rendered superfluous.
Id. at 1372. Likewise, the Court, in interpreting a predecessor to Section 78-12-2, long
ago stated: "[this Section] in substance provides that the State is barred from bringing an
action for the recovery of real property claimed by it, unless such action is commenced
within seven years." Pioneer Inv. & Trust Co. v. Board ofEduc. of Salt Lake City, 99 P.
150,152 (Utah 1909).
The State asserts that any statute of limitations defenses are invalid as against it
and relies heavily on an old case, Van Wagoner, 199 P. 670, in support of its position. In
Van Wagoner, the Court was asked to determine whether one could adversely possess
school trust lands as against the State. The defendant Whitmore had been in open,
notorious occupancy and possession of the land in question, which was school trust land.
He had enclosed the lands with a fence and made other improvements. Id. at 671. At the
time of the admission of Utah to the Union it was provided by law that one who was in
possession of land then given to the State by the Federal Government as grants in aid of
schools could make application and exercise preference rights for acquisition of title.
Whitmore did not pursue this remedy. In 1912, Van Wagoner entered into an agreement
to purchase the land in question from the state and was issued a certificate of sale. A
patent was issued to him in June, 1916. Thereafter he commenced an action in ejectment
against Whitmore, who by answer claimed title to the lands by adverse possession. The
court found that the adverse possession of Whitmore as against Van Wagoner did not
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commence until after the certificate of sale was issued to Van Wagoner in 1912. And
because the suit for ejectment was brought in 1918, the requisite period of time - seven
years - had not expired at the time of the commencement of the action. The question
involved, therefore, was whether Whitmore could hold adversely to the state of Utah.
This was the sole question discussed in the opinion of the court on that particular phase of
the case. The interest of the State in the land was asserted by a complaint in intervention
by the State. The State's contention was that the predecessor to Section 78-12-2, Section
6446, could not be applied against the State insofar as the class of lands involved were
concerned. The Court agreed finding that: "The plea of the statutes of limitation and the
claim of title by adverse possession should not prevail." Id. at 676.
The Van Wagoner decision has been addressed and narrowed to its facts by
subsequent decisions. In 1994, for instance, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed a trial
court's decision which found the statute of limitations in Section 78-12-2 not to be
applicable to Plaintiffs predecessor when it was acting in its capacity as trustee of public
school lands. Trail Mountain /, 884 P.2d at 1271. Although the Trail Mountain /court
cited Van Wagoner for the proposition that "states are generally exempt from the
applicable statute of limitations when acting in their capacity as school land trustees," it
went on to find, in direct contradiction of the stance taken by the State here, that "an
exception to the general rule is triggered when the state itself, through its legislature,
makes the statute of limitation applicable to the state." Id. (citing California State Lands
Comm yn v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 36, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Laramie County School
Dist. V Muir, 808 P.2d 797, 800-01 (Wyo. 1991); State ex rel. Cartwright v. Tidmore,
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674 P.2d 14, 16 (Okla. 1983)). In holding that Section 78-12-2 was applicable to
Plaintiffs predecessor when acting in its capacity as trustee of public school lands, the
Court of Appeals stated: "As if this section did not sufficiently indicate the Legislature's
intent to include the State within the statute of limitations, another section provides that
4

[t]he limitations in this article apply to actions brought in the name of for the benefit of

the state or other governmental entity, the same as to actions by private parties.'" Trail
Mountain /, 884 P.2d at 1271. The Court of Appeals thus concluded: "Given the
statutory scheme, we can only conclude that the Legislature intended to subject the State
to the applicable statute of limitations." Id.2
The Court of Appeals decision in Trail Mountain I was subsequently appealed to
the Utah Supreme Court, and, in 1996, the Court issued a decision affirming the Court of
Appeals' interpretation of Section 78-12-2 and its applicability to SITLA's predecessor.
There it was held that "[a] plain reading of the statute reveals that it applies to actions
brought by the state as a consequence of the state's claim of right to real property or
issues or profits derived from real property." See Trail Mountain II, 921 P.2d at 1372.
Here, a plain reading of Section 78-12-2 reveals that it is intended to apply to bar
the State's attempts to challenge its conveyance regardless of the fact that the State is
acting in its capacity as trustee. The State claims title to the Mathis Property based on
Congress's enactment of the Jones Act in 1927, an event that took place nearly eighty
years ago. Although the Mathis Defendants dispute the State's interpretation of the effect

2

Even assuming Van Wagoner were still good law, it is inapposite to the situation here.
The Mathis Defendants do not assert an interest in the land via adverse possession.
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of the Jones Act, there can be no dispute that for nearly eighty years the State sat idly by,
commencing no legal proceeding to challenge the effect of its own conveyance. Such a
fact is particularly notable given a letter dated April 24,1930, wherein the State's
Geologist, E.H Burdick, specifically warned the State that it "must face the situation
sooner or later, of quieting title to all parcels of school land sold without mineral
reservation." [R. 000703-000708.] Because the State's purported right to the Mathis
Property arose nearly eighty years ago, and because it did not commence an action to
assert its alleged interest in the Mathis Property during that time, the trial court correctly
concluded that the State's action is time barred.
B*

None of the cases cited by the State deal with a situation where, as here,
the State is challenging the price it received on a conveyance it made
nearly a century ago.

The crux of the State's argument is that Section 78-12-2 cannot be applied in a
manner that would prevent itfromreceiving "full value" for the Mathis Property. In
effect, the State wants the Court to declare that any time the State in hindsight believes it
sold real property for less than full value, it is free to challenge that conveyance,
irrespective of the passage of time. The problems with such an approach are obvious and
are directly implicated here.
First, it is difficult if not impossible for anyone to tell now, what the value of the
property was in 1905 when the State agreed to sell the Property. No fair market appraisal
or other type of valuation can even approximately determine the amount the State should
have received for property in the early part of the 20th century. This is made.twice as
difficult by the fact that at the time the State agreed to sell the Mathis Property in 1905, it
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had already been determined by the federal government to be of non-mineral character
because there were no commercially viable coal deposits. [R. 000408.] The fact that
modern technology developed over the past century has revealed the existence of
valuable coal deposits is irrelevant for determining what constituted "full value" in 1905.
Second, the State contends, albeit speculatively, that there was fraud in
connection with the transaction involving the Mathis Property which resulted in the State
receiving something less than full value.3 In making this contention the State focuses on
two audits performed at the State's request in the early 1920s. The audits, however, do
not support the State's position that fraud occurred in connection with the conveyance of
the Mathis Property.
Notably, the audits relied on by State specifically provide as follows: "It is not
assumed that all of the properties described herewith were fraudulently obtained. There
are miscellaneous entries which may have been made in good faith, yet it is thought
necessary to include their descriptions because of their location within the coal zone."
[R. 000800.] (emphasis added) Likewise, the Mainor Conniff lists over 9,156 acres of
Property as being acquired by CCLC, yet it notes that only approximately 5,564 of those
acres were subject to the lawsuits involving claims of fraud brought by the United States.
3

The case relied on by the State, Milner v. United States, 228 F. 431, 439 (8th Cir.
1915), is not relevant to purposes of this proceeding as it did not deal with the Mathis
Property. The Milner decision dealt with only 5,564.28 of the over 9,100 acres acquired
by CCLC between December 1900 and September 1903. Id. at 432. If the federal
government had believed that the Mathis Property had been conveyed in the same
manner as the other 5,500 acres, it assuredly would have included it in the lawsuit. The
fact that it was not included speaks volumes and the State's attempt to taint its own
conveyance of the Mathis Property by reference to a case involving completely different
property and unfounded speculation must fail.
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[R. 000849; 000870-00087L] In other words, transactions involving over 3,500 acres of
land granted to CCLC were not tainted by fraud. The State's reliance on the audits is
even more suspect given the fact that the State, even after a finding of fraud had been
made in the courts, agreed to eventually sell the 5,564 acres, including the minerals, to
CCLC. [R. 000850.]
The State's actions of 80 years ago demonstrate the inherent problems with the
State's position. For one thing, the audits conducted by the State show that the State was
well aware of any potential fraud claims regarding the sale of the Mathis Property as
early as the 1920, yet the State took no action. The audits also show that the State, at the
relevant time, did not believe that all conveyances made to CCLC were tainted by fraudGiven the foregoing, the trial court's application of Section 78-12-2 should be
affirmed and the State should be precluded from challenging its own actions which
resulted in a conveyance of the Mathis Property.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION MUST BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE MATHIS
FAMILY OWNS THE PROPERTY BY OPERATION OF THE AFTER-ACQUIRED
TITLE DOCTRINE.

Even though the statute of limitations was properly applied to bar the State's
action, the trial court's decision may be affirmed "on any proper ground, even though the
trial court relied on some other ground." DeBry, 889 P.2d at 448. The trial court's
decision should thus be affirmed in light of the clear language of the Jones Act, which, in
conjunction with the after-acquired title doctrine, operated to pass the State's title to
CCLC on January 25, 1927.
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A.

Title to the Mathis Property passed to Carbon County Land Company,
the original patentee, by after-acquired title under the Jones Act,
1.

The United States v. Sweet decision.

At statehood, Utah was given ownership by the federal government of four
sections of land in every 36-Section township.4 Utah subsequently sold many of those
sections without reserving the minerals.5
Although many states' enabling acts expressly excluded school lands of known
mineral character from their grants to the states, Utah's did not. Jensen, 645 P.2d at 34.
However, in 1918, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S.
4

The various grants of school lands to western states are as a rule contained in the
enabling act of that state. Section 6 of Utah's Enabling Act provides:
That upon the admission of said State into the Union, sections numbered two,
sixteen, thirty-two, and thirty-six in every township of said proposed State . . . are
hereby granted to said State for support of common schools
Ch. 138,28 Stat.
107(1894;.

5

In the early years of Utah's history, State school lands were sold without any
reservation of the mineral rights. Thus, any purchaser received fee simple title to both
the surface and mineral estates. In 1919, seven years after the State's conveyance of the
Mathis Property, the Utah legislature enacted a law requiring the reservation of mineral
rights in the State. See Spratling v. State Land Board, 437 P.2d 886, 887 (Utah 1968).
Utah Compiled Laws, § 5575x, which became effective May 2, 1919, provided:
All coal and other mineral deposits in lands belonging to the state of Utah
are hereby reserved to the state. Such deposits are reserved from sale,
except upon a rental and royalty basis as herein provided, and the purchaser
of any lands belonging to the state shall acquire no right, title or interest in
or to such deposits, but the rights of such purchaser shall be subject to the
reservation of all coal and other mineral deposits, and to the conditions and
limitations prescribed by law providing for the state and persons authorized
by it to prospect or mine, and to remove such deposits, and to occupy and
use so much of the surface of said land as may be required for all purposes
reasonably incident to the mining and removal of such deposits therefrom.
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563 (1918), held that as a matter of governmental policy, Congress's school land grant
did not pass title to lands known to be valuable for minerals at the time of Utah's
statehood, despite the fact that Utah's enabling act contained no reservation language.
Arising out of and consistent with the Sweet ruling, there was considerable administrative
litigation with respect to titles to school lands in various western states. See Jensen, 645
P.2d at 34.
2.

The Department's administrative proceedings create
uncertainty and doubt as to the title of lands in the Western
United States.

In June of 1924, the Department directed its local General Land Office to institute
administrative litigation against the State and the State's transferees to set aside the
State's title to approximately 100 sections of land in Utah, including the Property at issue
in this case. [R. 000023-000037.] The State, together with its transferee, CCLC, jointly
resisted the Department's actions as they related to the Property. On September 4,1926,
the Department recommended to the Secretary of the Interior that the State's claim to the
Property be denied in light of the fact that it had been determined under the new
geological inference standard to be of known mineral character at the time Utah was
admitted to the Union. [SeeR. 000040-000113.] Only four days later, on September 8,
1926, the Secretary of Interior upheld the Department's recommendation. [R. 000114000115.] With the Secretary's ruling, title to the Property was deemed never to have
passed to the State. The impact of the Department's rulings on these issues was felt far
and wide as a resulting cloud of uncertainty enveloped the title of all school trust lands
rendering them practically valueless. [R. 000658.] The Department's actions also
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worked a great injustice upon the citizens who, in good faith, had previously made
purchases of these lands.6
3.

Congress attempts to deal with the Department of Interior's
actions by enacting the Jones Act.

In an effort to deal with the difficulties that had arisen in light of the Department's
actions, on January 25,1927 Congress enacted what became known as the Jones Act,
"which expressly extended the school land grants to include sections mineral in
character." See Jensen, 645 P.2d at 34. As enacted on January 25,1927, applicable
provisions of the Jones Act, provided as follows:
6

As pointed out by Utah Congressman Don Colton in his remarks given shortly before
the passage of the Jones Act in 1927:
These States must depend largely upon the funds derived from the sale of these
lands for the maintenance of that great institution - our common school system. It
also worked a great injustice upon the citizens who, in good faith, made purchases
of these lands. The State would transfer its title in good faith. In later years
subsequent development of the surrounding territory would show promise of being
mineral in character, and this often after extensive and expensive exploration work
had been done or perhaps, in the meantime, science had developed a new process
making valuable a deposit which theretofore had no value or science may
conclude that certain physical conditions are now known to indicated the presence
of mineral. When these circumstances would arise the title would be attacked for
the first time and the purchasers in good faith or the State, or both, would be called
upon to defend a title which had been in repose for many years. In some
instances, it was shown that land which had been classified as nonmineral land by
one branch of Government would, years afterwards, be claimed as mineral land by
another branch of the Government. The result was hopeless, endless confusion
and chaos because the States could not rely upon a classification of the
Government's own agents nor, in fact, would the Government rely upon the
classification made by its agents. This was particularly true in the States of
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon,
Washington, Wyoming, and Utah.
Congr. Rec, 69th Congr., Vol. 68, Part 2, Jan. 17, 1927, p. 1816 [ R. 000657-000658.]
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(a) That the grant of numbered mineral sections under this act shall be of
the same effect as prior grants for the numbered mineral sections, and title
to such numbered mineral sections shall vest in the States at the time and in
the manner and be subject to all the rights of adverse parties recognized by
existing law in the grants of numbered nonmineral sections.
(b)That the additional grant made by this Act is upon the express condition
that all sales, grants, deeds, or patents for any of the lands so granted shall
be subject to and contain a reservation to the State of all the coal and other
minerals in the lands so sold, granted, deeded, or patented, together with the
right to prospect for, mine and remove the same. The coal and other mineral
deposits in such lands shall be subject to lease by the State as the State
legislature may direct, the proceeds of rentals and royalties therefrom to be
utilized for the support or in aid of the common or public schools.
See Ch. 57, 44 Stat. 1026(a)-(b) (1927). [See Addendum Tab B.] Although the Jones
Act attempted to resolve the uncertainties that had resulted in light of the Department's
actions by extending the prior grants of land to embrace school sections irrespective of
their mineral character, it was not entirely successful.
In 1929, SITLA's predecessor, the State Land Board of Utah, sent a letter to the
Department, seeking an opinion from the Department regarding a rather obvious problem
that had arisen in interpreting the Jones Act of 1927. [R. 000660- 000662; see
Addendum Tab E.] Notably, the question articulated by the State Land Board in its 1929
letter is precisely the one presented in the instant case: Whether the Jones Act of 1927 is
applicable to conveyances of land occurring prior to its passage, such that its provisions
restricting the sale of minerals would be retroactively applied to the prior conveyances?
This question was and remains critical to hundreds if not thousands of acres of previously
conveyed school sections.
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In its 1929 letter, the State Land Board, in direct contradiction to the stance it has
taken in the instant case, recognized that the Jones Act's restrictions on mineral transfers
applied only to conveyances made by the State after January 25,1927. [Id.] According
to the State Land Board, prior transferees would take title to the lands through application
of Utah's after-acquired title statute without implicating the Jones Act's restrictions on
mineral transfers. The State Land Board believed that "[t]o hold otherwise would result
in defeating to a considerable extent the purpose of the Act of 1927, which was to quiet
title to the State lands and create some stability as to the titles." [Id.] As sagely pointed
out by the State in 1929, any other conclusion would necessarily "require a determination
in the case of every section sold by the State prior to 1919, without reservation, of
whether or not the land was known valuable mineral land at the time of the State's right
under the original grant would have attached in the absence of known valuable mineral
character, which is the same question that caused so much confusion, uncertainty and
dissatisfaction as to our state titles." [Id.]
In response to the State's 1929 letter, the Department came up with the illogical
argument that somehow the Jones Act passed only a "conditional" fee title with the
possibility of reverter to the United States in the event the State failed to observe the
conditions, including the restrictions on mineral transfers, of the Jones Act. Under the
Department's reading of the Jones Act, title to lands disposed of by the State prior to
1927 would be subject to revocation when and if there were ever a determination that the
lands conveyed were of known mineral character. The Department's nonsensical
interpretation of the Jones Act required further congressional action to remove the cloud
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from lands like the Mathis Property that had been conveyed prior to the effective date of
the Jones Act and that were of known mineral character at statehood.
4.

Congress amends the Jones Act in 1932 to further clarify that
the Act did not apply to sales by the states occurring prior to
January 25,1927.

To clarify the Jones Act of 1927, an amendment was passed in 1932 which added
nine important words (shown in bolded text below) to subsection (b). As amended,
subsection (b) provided:
(b) The additional grant made by this Act is upon the express condition that
all sales, grants, deeds, or patents for any of the lands so granted shall
hereafter be subject to and contain a reservation to the State of all the coal
and other minerals in the lands so sold, granted, deeded, or patented,
together with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same. The
coal and other mineral deposits in such lands not heretofore disposed of
by the State shall be subject to lease by the State as the State legislature
may direct, the proceeds and rentals and royalties therefrom to be utilized
for the support or in aid of the common or public schools: Provided, That
any lands or minerals hereafter disposed of contrary to the provisions of
this Act shall be forfeited to the United States by appropriate proceedings
instituted by the Attorney General for that purpose in the United States
district court for the district in which the property or some part thereof is
located.
See 43 U.S.C. § 870 (emphasis added). [See Addendum Tab C] The inclusion of
the nine additional words was obviously meant to distinguish between state land
sales occurring prior to January 25, 1927 and those occurring after January 25,
1927, and to clarify that prior conveyances of "mineral" lands by the states were
not subject to the reservation requirements imposed by the Jones Act.
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5.

The State flip-flops positions on the Jones Act over 75 years
later.

In contravention to what the State recognized in its 1929 letter, the State now
contends that when it received title to the Property under the Jones Act on January 25,
1927, it was prohibited by Utah law from transferring the mineral estate of the Property
or prohibited from doing so by the Jones Act itself. Thus, by operation of law, it argues,
a severance of the mineral estate occurred, with the State retaining title to the mineral
estate underlying the Property. Not only is the State's argument squarely inconsistent
with its earlier position on the matter, but it also misconstrues the legal doctrine of afteracquired title and wholly fails to recognize the express language of the Jones Act.
6.

The Jones Act did not contemplate a severance of the mineral
estates of land disposed of by the State prior to 1927.

No severance of the Property's mineral estate occurred under the Jones Act. As
previously stated, to clear up the uncertainty that had resulted in light of the Department's
actions to set aside Congressional grants of school lands, Congress enacted the Jones Act
in early 1927. Questions concerning the interpretation of the Jones Act quickly arose,
however, causing Congress to clarify the Act by amending subsection (b) to include the
words "hereafter," "not heretofore disposed of by the state" and "hereafter" in 1932.7 See

7

The amendments made in 1932 largely comport with a proposition made in a letter by
the State Land Office dated April 24,1930, wherein it took the position that under the
Department's reading of the Jones Act, the State of Utah did not know what mineral
lands it owned, and that until such a determination was made it seemed impossible for the
state to administer its mineral estate for maximum return. Thus, the letter proposed two
courses of action, one being "To endeavor to have an Act passed by Congress quieting
title in the various states to all school mineral lands sold by it prior to the Act of 1927 . . .
." [See Letter dated April 24,1930; R. 000703-000708.]
28

43 U.S.C. § 870. Notably, the 1932 amendments were applied retroactively so as to be
applicable on January 25,1927 - the date of original enactment of the Jones Act. See 43
C.F.R. §2623.1(2006).
The additional words, "hereafter" and "heretofore" when construed according to
their normal usage can only mean that no severance of the mineral estate occurred with
respect to the Property. According to Black's Law Dictionary, "hereafter" means "from
now on; henceforth" or at "some future time," and "heretofore" means "up to now; before
this time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 730, 732 (7th ed. 1999) The words "hereafter"
and "heretofore" thus show that Congress clearly intended the Jones Act to distinguish
between lands conveyed prior to January 25,1927 and those that would be later
conveyed.
Moreover, by including the words "not heretofore disposed of by the State"
Congress expressly recognized that states, including Utah, had, prior to January 25, 1927,
already conveyed lands of mineral character without reserving minerals. Because only
lands of known mineral character at the time of a state's statehood were affected by the
Jones Act, the language of the 1932 amendments only makes sense and can only apply to
conveyances by the states occurring prior to January 25, 1927. By using the words "not
heretofore disposed o f Congress implicitly recognized that the doctrines of afteracquired title or estoppel by deed applied to conveyances made by the states prior to the
Jones Act, otherwise the language is meaningless.
In essence, the State takes the position that Jones Act restricted any transfer of
mineral interests by the State regardless of when the conveyance occurred and that if
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after-acquired title is deemed to have accrued to CCLC, it did so only after a severance of
the mineral interests. For the State's argument to be believed, the 1932 amendatory
language under the Jones Act and its history must be absolutely ignored. Indeed, one
must believe that the 1932 amendment was undertaken and completed by Congress for no
purpose whatsoever. Such a contention cannot prevail. See Trail Mountain II, 921 P.2d
at 1372 (refusing to construe a statute so as to render its terms superfluous).
Moreover, the State's reading of the Jones Act would defeat to a considerable
extent its very purpose, which was to resolve the uncertainty that had resulted in light of
the Department's actions and provide stability regarding titles of lands of the State,
something the State obviously understood at the time of its 1929 letter. If, as the State
now asserts, such an interpretation were to prevail, it would require a determination in the
case of every section sold by the State prior to the Jones Act of whether it was of known
mineral character, which, ironically, is exactly the same question that resulted in so much
confusion and chaos in the first place. The State's present argument would once again
subject the ownership of an untold number of acres of land within Utah to legal
uncertainty. The State would be free to bring "test cases" at any point in time to
challenge the ownership of tracts on the theory that the tract was of known mineral
character in 1896, just as the State has done here with the Appellees. The citizens of
Utah should not be subject to such conduct by the State, especially given the clarity
offered by Congress with the 1932 amendments.
Had Congress intended the Jones Act to be interpreted or overlooked in the
manner now advocated by the State, it certainly would have avoided the trouble of
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amending the Jones Act to include the additional words "hereafter" and "not heretofore
disposed of." A plain reading of the Jones Act, as amended, therefore, demonstrates that
its requirement that states reserve minerals applied only to grants of land made by the
states subsequent to January 25,1927; not to grants made by the states prior to January
25,1927, including the grant made by the State to CCLC by Patent in 1912.
7.

There was no severance of the mineral estate under Utah law.

It is well-settled in Utah that under the after-acquired title doctrine a conveyance
made by a grantor not holding fee title to property is binding when the grantor later
obtains fee title. Arnold Industries, Inc. v. Love, 2002 UT 133, f 16, 63 P.3d 721. "The
after-acquired-title doctrine is based upon the principle that where one having no title or
imperfect title purports to convey good title to another, and afterwards acquires good title
to the land, the subsequently acquired title should and does inure to the benefit of the
original grantee;5 Tompkins State Bank v. Niles, 537 N.E.2d 274,278 (111. 1989). Utah
law has long embraced this well known principle. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-10 (2005).
The doctrine of after-acquired title gets its force from the doctrine of estoppel by deed. It
has been said that
[a] grantor is generally estopped from denying the title of his grantee or his
own authority to sell. One who assumes to convey an estate by deed will
not be heard, for the purpose of defeating the title of the grantee, to say that
at the time of the conveyance he had no title, or that none passed by the
deed, and he cannot deny the full operation and effect of the deed as a
conveyance. In other words, he is estopped to dispute the title granted.
Kennedy Oil v. Lance Oil & Gas Co., 126 P.3d 875, 884 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting 28 Am.
Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 11 (2d ed. 2000)). Under the law of estoppel by deed, a
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party to a contract cannot pronounce its own deed invalid, regardless of whether the party
is an individual or a sovereign state. See, e.g., Wolcott v. Des Moines Nav. & R.R. Co.,
72 U.S. 681, 687 (1866); see also Daniell v. Sherrill, 48 So. 2d 736, 740 (Fla. 1950)
(concluding the state was estopped from denying the title of its grantee); Crosbie v.
Partridge, 205 P. 758, 766 (Okla. 1922) (finding "the law of estoppel by deed applies
against the government, and it cannot assert anything in derogation of its grant/')
(internal quotations omitted); State v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 78 So. 47, 48 (Ala. 1918)
(same). As stated by the Supreme Court of West Virginia in State v. Central Pocahontas
Coal Co.,
If one makes a deed to real estate to which he has no title, and subsequently
acquires title thereto, he will be estopped from claiming said real estate
against his grantor, and so the state in a proceeding like this, even though it
had no title at the time of the conveyance, would be estopped to set up a
subsequently acquired title against its own grantor.
98 S.E. 214,218 (W.Va. 1919) (emphasis added). The effect of the doctrine of estoppel
by deed and after acquired title is to vest title in the grantee automatically and instantly
by operation of law. See, e,g., United Okl Bank v. Moss, 793 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Okla.
1990) (concluding that after-acquired title passes by force of law "immediately (eo
instante)").
Even before the State originally conveyed the Mathis Property to CCLC in 1912,
Utah had codified, at least in part, the doctrine of estoppel by deed. In 1907, Section
1979 of Utah's Compiled Laws provided:
After acquired title inures to prior grantee. If any person shall hereafter
convey any real estate by conveyance purporting to convey the same in fee
simple absolute, and shall not at the time of such conveyance have the legal
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estate to such real estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same, the legal
estate subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee, his
heirs, successors, or assigns, and such conveyance shall be as valid as if
such legal estate had been in the grantor at the time of the conveyance.
Utah Compiled Laws § 1979 (1907).8
Based on the foregoing, the State's grantee, CCLC, was entitled to the benefit of
the conveyance in fee simple as fully "as i f the fee simple title acquired by the State in
1927 under the Jones Act had existed in the State "at the time of the conveyance" it
originally made in 1912.
In light of Spratling v. State Land Board, 437 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1968), the
State's contention that the mineral interest in the Property could not be conveyed because
of the 1919 legislation which required the state to reserve mineral interests it itself can
not withstand scrutiny. In Spratling, the Utah Supreme Court expressly rejected the
contention put forth by the State when it held that the 1919 enactment was not retroactive
in effect and therefore could not be applied to sales of state land that occurred, as in this
case, prior to its enactment. Id. at 888 ("the 1919 legislature clearly made the act
operative, not ex post facto, but in futuro . . . . " ) . That the 1919 legislation was not
retroactive was a fact known by the State as far back as July 17, 1929. [See R. 000660In 1917, the same language was present in Utah's Compiled laws, although the section
number had changed to 4879. Section 4879, provided:
After acquired title insures to prior grantee. If any person shall hereafter
convey any real estate by conveyance purporting to convey the same in fee simple
absolute, and shall not at the time of such conveyance have the legal estate to such
real estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same, the legal estate subsequently
acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee, his heirs, successors, or assigns,
and such conveyance shall be as valid as if such legal estate had been in the
grantor at the time of the conveyance.
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000662] (expressly recognizing that the 1919 legislation did not apply to sales by the
State prior to 1919.)
Consequently, when the Jones Act of 1927 was enacted, any title in the Mathis
Property that vested in the State immediately, by operation of law, inured pursuant to the
doctrine of after acquired title to CCLC. Because the after acquired title doctrine relates
back to the original time of conveyance, Utah's 1919 statutory enactment requiring the
State to reserve minerals could not and did not effectuate an ex post facto severance of
the mineral estate.
B.

Under Utah law, the doctrines of estoppel by deed and after-acquired
title apply to the State's Patent to Carbon County Land Company.

The touchstone for determining whether after-acquired title passes is not the name
given the particular conveyance document, but rather the interest being conveyed. Under
Utah law, the after-acquired doctrine is triggered when a conveyance purports to convey
title in "fee simple." See Utah Compiled Laws § 1979 (1907); Utah Compiled Laws §
4879 (1917).9 Utah law has long recognized that "fee simple title is presumed to be
intended to pass by a conveyance of real estate, unless it appears from the conveyance
that a lesser estate was intended." See Utah Compiled Laws § 1971 (1907); see also Utah
Code Ann. § 57-1-3 (2005)(same). Because the State's 1912 Patent to CCLC was a

9

In Utah fee simple and fee simple absolute are synonymous and used interchangeably.
See, e.g., Falula Farms v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d 569, 572 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (finding that
"the fee simple title to the vacated strip of land reverted to Mrs. Ludlow" and that "[fjrom
that point on, Mrs. Ludlow held the fee simple absolute title and enjoyed the exclusive
right to use and control the . . . strip"); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 630-31 (7th
ed. 1999).
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conveyance in fee simple, the after-acquired title doctrine was applicable to automatically
convey the title later received by the State under the Jones Act to CCLC.
It is commonly accepted that a patent conveys title in fee simple to the patentee.10
See 63C AM. JUR. 2d Public Lands § 49 (1997) (A patent may convey fee simple
ownership to the patentee.") The Utah Supreme Court found as much in McNeil v.
McNeil, wherein it stated "on January 30, 1913, the state of Utah by its deed or letters
patent conveyed the lands in fee simple to the defendant

" 211 P. 988,989 (Utah

1922). Because the Patent was a conveyance of fee simple title, it was effective to pass
after-acquired title from the State to CCLC.
The State contends that its Patent should be construed as a quitclaim deed and thus
incapable of passing after- acquired title.11 Aside from directly contradicting the stance

w

See, e.g., United States v. Bowling, 256 U.S. 484,485 (1921) ("The patent was dated
April 8,1890, conveyed a fee simple title...."); Van Zelst v. Commissioner, 100 F.3d
1259, 1261 (7th Cir. 1996)( "A iand patent' is equivalent to fee simple ownership.");
Yellen v. Hickel, 352 F. Supp. 1300, 1307 (S.D. Cal. 1972) ("Holders of land patents, on
the other hand, have fee simple titles vested in them."); Britt v. Federal Land Bank
Assoc, 505 N.E.2d 387, 392 (111. Ct. App. 1987) ("A land patent is merely the deed by
which the government passes fee simple title of government land to private persons.");
Stansbury v. MDR Dev., L.L.C., 871 A.2d 612, 620 (Md Ct. App. 2005) (finding that a
patent conveyed fee simple title which is the "the highest form of ownership a person can
have in real property"); see also In re Mauk, 56 B.R. 445, 448 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985)
(finding that a land patent is the instrument by which the government conveys title to
public lands and that any such conveyance, in the absence of restrictions, is a conveyance
of fee simple ownership).
11

The State cites Ellingstad v. State of Alaska, 979 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1999) for this
proposition. The Ellingstad case, however, is readily distinguishable from the instant
case for at least three reasons. First, the statement by the Alaska court that the patent
deed operates as a quit claim deed is mere dicta, in that the court was not dealing with a
patent but instead a quit claim deed. Given that the Alaska court had already determined
that the state did not agree to issue a patent, the court's determination of the effect of a
^

it took on this issue in 1929,12 SITLA's argument misses the point - a patent is not a
quitclaim deed, it is a patent.
Even if the patent were akin to quitclaim deed, the analysis would not end by
simply designating it as such.13 Regardless of the title ascribed a given conveyance, if

patent was unnecessary. Second, the Alaska court implicitly recognizes that the there is
in fact a difference between quitclaim deed and a patent by accepting the state's argument
although it would normally issue a patent to a contract holder, but that "the issuance of a
quitclaim deed . . . was 'in the best interests of the state.'" Id. at 1005. If, as articulated
by the Alaska Court, a patent is the same as a quit claim, it would not have mattered
whether the state conveyed by patent or quitclaim deed. This inconsistency is
inexplicable, unless, of course, a patent and quitclaim deed are not equivalent. Third, the
after-acquired statute at issue in the instant case does not allow for a simple determination
of the particular name given a document, but instead requires the intent of the grantor to
be determined by looking at the conveyance.
12

In its 1929 letter to the Department of Interior, SITLA's predecessor, the State Land
Board, acknowledged that the doctrine of after-acquired title applied to affect
conveyances made by the State via patents. Now that the once-advocated position does
comport with its instant objectives, the State has conveniently changed its position. [See
Addendum Tab E.]
13

A number of courts have concluded that a state may be precluded by its patent or grant
in the same manner as private grantors. 23 AM. JUR. 2d Deeds § 280; see, e.g., State v.
Mobile & O. R. Co., 78 So. 47,48 (Ala. 1918) (rejecting the state's contention that a
patent was in effect a quitclaim deed and therefore not effective to pass after acquired
title); Martin v. United States, 270 F. 2d 65, 68 (4th Cir. 1959) (finding that state's deed
which purported to convey fee title to United States of land to which state had no title
sufficed to transfer state's subsequently acquired rights in that land.); Daniell v. Sherrill,
48 So. 2d 736, (Fla. 1950) (holding that the State of Florida, upon acquiring title from the
United States, could not assert the invalidity of its prior deeds to its citizens); Wolcott v.
Des Moines Nav. & R.R. Co., 72 U.S. 681, 687 (1950) (concluding that "although the
State possessed no title to the lot in dispute at the time of the conveyance to the Des
Moines Navigation and Railroad Company, yet, having an after-acquired title by the act
of Congress, it would enure to the benefit of the grantees."); State v. Central Pocahontas
Coal Co., 98 S.E. 214,218 (W. Va. 1919) (concluding that State of West Virginia, "even
though it had no title at the time of its conveyance, [was] estopped to set up a
subsequently acquired title against its own grantor."); In re Morthart, 78 Inter. Dec. 307,
4 IBLA 1 (1971) (concluding that under California law, a patent given by the State of
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the conveyance "purports and is intended to convey only the right, title and interest in the
land, as distinguished from the land itself, it comes within the terms of a quitclaim deed,
but if it appears that the intention was to convey the land itself, then it is not a quitclaim
deed, although it may possess characteristics peculiar to such deeds/' Henningsen v.
Stromberg, 221 P.2d 438, 443 (Mont. 1950) (concluding that a quitclaim deed which
used the phrases "successors and assigns forever," "to have and to hold," and "heirs and
assigns forever" was sufficient to convey the land itself and not just the grantor's interest
in the land) (emphasis added)); Hamblin v. Woolley, 167 P.2d 100, 104 (Ariz. 1946)
(concluding that although "a mere quitclaim deed will not carry after-acquired title

it

is settled that a deed in the form of a quitclaim may carry after-acquired title. It all
depends upon the recitations in the particular instrument."); see also Dowse v.
Kammerman, 246 P.2d 881, 882 (Utah 1952) (recognizing that the language used in
rather than the title of the conveyance determines the extent of the estate conveyed); 23
AM. JUR. 2d Deeds § 286 (2002) ("A conveyance, although using the terminology of a
quitclaim deed, may be regarded as something more than such a deed and operate to
estop the grantor from asserting after-acquired title . . . . " ) . As noted in 58 A.L.R. § 345
(1929),
[I]f there are recitals or covenants in the deed showing an intention not to
limit the interest conveyed to that merely which the grantor then had, or
expressly or impliedly affirming the existence of a particular estate which
the parties intended should pass by the conveyance, the grantor may be
estopped from asserting an after-acquired title or interest in contradiction of
the terms or implications of the deed, even though the granting clause was
in the form of a quitclaim.
California was effective to pass after-acquired title).
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Given that the Patent in question is not by anyone's definition a statutory form
quitclaim deed, see Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-17, it is particularly important that the
specific language set forth in the Patent be carefully examined and every word and clause
given adequate consideration. See Haynes v. Hunt, 85 P.2d 861, 864 (Utah 1939) ("It is
an elemental rule of construction that in construing such instruments every word must be
given effect if possible and reasonable, upon the theory that the grantor used no words
except those necessary or convenient to express the intent of the parties."). For a number
of reasons, a close examination of the Patent refutes the State's contention that it is
ineffective to pass after-acquired title.
First, the Patent conveys the land itself, rather than the State's interest in and to the
land. As evidence of this, the Patent uses the language "hereby granting and
confirming unto the said Carbon County Land Company, a corporation and its
successors and assigns forever, the following piece of land,..." [See R. 000637.]
(emphasis added). Courts have interpreted the word "grant" to be equivalent to
"convey." See In re Estate ofMartinek, 488 N.E.2d 1332, 1336 (111. App. 1986) ("The
word 'grant' is a generic term that is equivalent at common law to the term 'convey.'" );
Young v. Little's Unknown Heirs, 232 S.W.2d 614, 620 (Term. App. 1949) ("[T]he word
'grant' being equivalent to the word 'convey'".); see also Leadville v. Coronado Min.
Co., 67 P. 289, 294 (Colo. 1901) ("[T]he word 'convey' is the equivalent of the word
'grant;' that the word 'grant' has no more apt synonym than the word 'convey[.]'").
This is important because the term "convey" is generally accepted as a means by which a
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grantor grants fee simple title. But even standing alone, the word grant is sufficient to
pass a particular estate, namely a fee simple estate. See also Severns v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100, 104-105 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) ("To convey a fee, all that is
required is the word 'grant'"); Schlageter v. Cutting, 2 P.2d 875, 878 (Cal. App. 1931)
("It is only essential that a deed or conveyance should use the word 'grant' to convey an
estate in fee simple absolute.").
The Patent is further differentiated from a statutory form quitclaim deed in a
number of respects. Notably, the Patent does not merely attempt to quitclaim all of the
States "right, title and interest" to the Mathis Property. See 23 AM. JUR. 2d Deeds § 225
(2002) (noting that "where only the grantor's right, title, or interest is quitclaimed, such
operative words are conclusive that the instrument is a quitclaim."), nor does it use a
granting clause like those found in statutory form quitclaim conveyances. See Utah Code
Ann. § 57-1-13 (2007) ("hereby quitclaims").
The inclusion of the words "successors and assigns forever" also shows that the
State intended to convey the land, and not merely its interest in the land, absolutely and
unconditionally. Waterfowl LLC v. United States, 453 F.3d 291, 300 (5th Cir. 2006) ("A
grant to an individual or entity and its 'successors or assigns forever' is a legal term of art
that establishes that the object or interest is conveyed absolutely and unconditionally.");
see also C &Gv. Rule, 25 P.3d 76, 79-80 (Idaho 2001) (grantor's use of "successors and
assigns, forever" showed intent to grant fee simple title); Utah Compiled Laws § 1970
(1907) (recognizing that the terms "heirs" or other "technical words of inheritance" are
sufficient but not necessary to transfer a fee in real property).
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The State seeks to simply brash aside the words of the Patent "subject to any
easement orrightof way," but in so doing fails to account for the fact that the only
justification for using the clause "subject to" is to expressly limit otherwise applicable
warranties of title. See 23 AM. JUR. 2d Deeds § 246 (2002) ("The words 'subject to9 in a
deed conveying an interest in real property . . . connote a limitation on a grantor's
warranty, and not a reservation ofrights.");see also Hancock v. Planned Development
Corp., 791 P.2d 183,186 (Utah 1990) (finding that the words "subject to fence line"
restricted covenants of quiet possession and freedom from encumbrances); Pruitt v.
Meadows, 393 So. 2d 986, 986 (Ala. 1981) (finding the language "subject to any and all
easements, rights of way, reservations and restrictions appearing of record and affecting
the property" isfrequentlyused to limit warranties of title). The "subject to" language is
only employed when covenants or warranties are at issue. If the Patent were truly a
quitclaim deed, there would have been no reason for the State to limit its warranties by
using the "subject to" clause, as a quitclaim conveyance would have contained no such
warranties in the first place.
In sum, nothing about the Patent indicates that it is a conveyance akin to a
statutory form quitclaim deed. It should therefore not be construed as one in order to
avoid application of the doctrine of after-acquired title. Consequently, the State cannot
now assert anything in derogation of its grant.
1.

The State's argument regarding lack of privity is without merit.

The State contends that even if the doctrine of after-acquired is applicable to the
Patent, the Mathis Defendants' lack of privity with CCLC precludes application of the
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doctrine in the instant case. Such a contention is without merit. When, on January 25,
1927, by virtue of the passage of the Jones Act, the State finally acquired title to the
Mathis Property, the same title which it had previously conveyed to CCLC by Patent, that
title, by operation of the after-acquired title statute, automatically inured to CCLC. At
that point in time, none of the Mathis Defendants were in the picture, and the sole
beneficiary under the doctrine of after- acquired title was CCLC. Because the Mathis
Property belonged to CCLC as of January 25,1927, when it failed to pay the property
taxes for that year, Carbon County, as it was authorized to do under Utah law,
commenced tax sale proceedings. The tax sale proceedings eventually resulted in a sale
and conveyance of the Mathis Property to the predecessor of the Mathis Defendants.
As a result of the foregoing, the State's contention that the Court need not consider
the doctrine of after-acquired title is fundamentally flawed, in that it overlooks the fact
that the CCLC was the beneficiary, not the Mathis Defendants, of the State's afteracquired title. The Mathis Defendants claim merely that the doctrine precludes the State
from asserting anything in derogation of its 1912 grant to CCLC. Whether the Mathis
Defendants are in privity with CCLC is, therefore, of no consequence.
The cases the State relies on for its privity argument are inapposite. The State cites
Hussman v. Durham, 165 U.S. 144 (1897) mdBradham v. United States, 168 F.2d 905
(10th Cir. 1948) for the proposition that lack of privity precludes application of the afteracquired doctrine in the instant case. Hussman, however, dealt with the question of
whether one who purchases government owned, and therefore tax exempt, land from a
void tax sale can later estop one who subsequently purchases and procures a valid
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conveyance of the same land from the government. 165 U.S. 147-50. In Bradham, the
issue was whether one who purchases at a tax sale can reform a previous conveyance to
which he "was neither a party thereto nor in privity with a party thereto." 168 F.2d at 907.
Bradham is clearly inapplicable here because the Mathis Defendants are not attempting to
reform a deed.
2.

The State's contention that the Mathis Defendants cannot show
reliance on the Patent miscomprehends the doctrine of after-acquired
title.

The State further contends that based on common law equitable estoppel analysis
the after-acquired title doctrine would not apply because the Mathis Defendants could not
reasonably rely on the Patent in question. [See Appellant's Brief, p. 35.] In doing so, the
State urges the Court to apply general principles of equitable estoppel to the doctrine of
after-acquired title. While the doctrine is an equitable one, courts have consistently
refused to engraft the law of equitable estoppel to the after-acquired title doctrine. See 28
AM. JUR. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 4 (2000) ("Estoppel by deed is technical in nature.");
Equitable Royalty Corp. v. Hullet, 243 P.2d 986, 991 (Okla. 1952) (distinguishing
estoppel by deed from equitable estoppel). Nevertheless, whether the Mathis
Defendants' relied on the Patent is not even relevant to the application of the afteracquired title. The only relevant reliance would have been that of the original grantee.
See Arnold, 2002 UT 133, \ 19 (concluding that even if reasonable reliance was
necessary, it was the original grantee's reliance that was relevant and not the subsequent
purchaser's) (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Mathis Defendants respectfully request that the District
Court's decision granting the summary judgment in their favor be affirmed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of June, 2008.

PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C.

Ronald G. Russell
Daniel A. Jensen
Royce B. Covington
Attorneys for the Appellees
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART II. ACTIONS, VENUE, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
ARTICLE 1. REAL PROPERTY
.+ § 78-12-2. Actions by the state
The state will not sue any person for or in respect to any real property, or the
issues or profits thereof, by reason of the right or title of the state to the
same, unless:
(1) such right or title shall have accrued within seven years before any action or
other proceeding for the same shall be commenced; or
(2) the state or those from whom it claims shall have received the rents and
profits of such real property, or some part thereof, within seven years.
Current through 2007 First Special Session including results from the
November 2007 General Election.
Copr © 2007 Thomson Reuters/West
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SIXTY-NINTH CONGRESS. SESS. II. CHS. 56, 57. 1927.

no
uncord of ei ndi* *° e x c e e i * ^ **hount necessary for the proper care, repair,
11
tures and recei^s* maintenance, and operation of the bridge and its approaches. An
accurate record of the amount paid for acquiring the bridge and its
approaches, the expenditures for operating, repairing, and maintaining the same, and of the daily tolls collected shall be kept, and
shall be available for the information of all persons interested.
n
f
conSructicm«Ss etc° SEC. 6. The said Tacony-Paimyra Bridge Company, its successors
to befiledafter'com- and assigns, shall within ninety days after the completion of such
pietion.
bridge file with t h e Secretary of W a r a sworn itemized statement
showing the actual original cost of constructing such bridge and its
approaches, t h e actual cost of acquiring any interest in real propInvestigation by Sec- erty necessary therefor, and the actual financing and promotion
retary of war.
costs. The Secretary of War may, at any time within three years
after the completion of such bridge, investigate the actual cost of
constructing the same and for such purpose the said Tacony-Palmyra
Bridge Company, its successors and assigns, shall make available
all of its records in connection with the financing and the construct i v e * o f ^ ^ ^ lion thereof. The findings of the Secretary of War as to the actual
original cost of the bridge shall be conclusive, subject only to review
in a court of equity for fraud or gross mistake.
sel1 etc
COSSWL*0
" " SEC. 7. The right to sell, assign, transfer, and mortgage all the
rights, powers, and privileges conferred by this Act, is hereby
granted to the said Tacony-Palmyra Bridge Company, its successors
and assigns, and any corporation to which or any person to whom
such rights, powers, and privileges may be sold, assigned, or transferred, or who shall acquire the same by mortgage foreclosure or
otherwise, is hereby authorized and empowered to exercise the same
as fully as though conferred herein directly upon such corporation
or person.
Amendment.
g j ^ g The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby
expressly reserved.
Approved, January 25, 1927.

January 25,1927.
CSfltt-l
[PubMc, No. 570.1

C H A P . 57.—An A«t Confirming in States and Territories title t o lands
granted b y the United States in the aid of common or public schools.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
G^te^o^'tates of United States of America m Congress assenibted, That, subject to
common school se©- t h e provisions of subsections ( a ) , ( b ) , a n d (c) of this section, t h e
tions extended to mm-

erai sections.

r

• V'~> *• + -»—•=-**' _v»/

.

™J ~,

several grants to t h e btates 01 numbered sections in place for t h e
support or in aid of common or public schools be, a n d they a r e
hereby, extended to embrace numbered school sections mineral i n
Exceptions.
character, unless land h a s been granted to a n d / o r selected by a n d
certified or approved, to any such State or States as indemnity or
in lieu of any land so granted b y numbered sections.
statwf vested mt
(a) That the grant of numbered mineral sections under this Act
shall be of the same effect as prior grants for the numbered nonmineral sections, and titles to such numbered mineral sections shall
tected.mg g U ^ vest in the States at the time and in the manner and be subject to
all the rights of adverse parties recognized by existing law in the
Mineral ri hts on g r a n ^ s °f numbered nonmmeral sections.
sold lands reserved to
(b) T h a t the additional g r a n t made by this A c t is upon t h e
the states.
express condition t h a t all sales, grants, deeds, or patents for any
of t h e lands so granted shall be subject to and contain a reservation
to t h e State of all t h e coal a n d other minerals in t h e lands so sold,
Leases authorieed. granted, deeded or patented, together with the right to prospect for,
mine, a n d remove the same. T h e coal a n d other mineral deposits
in such lands shall be subject to lease by t h e State as t h e State legislature m a y direct, t h e proceeds of rentals and royalties therefrom
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to be utilized for the support or in aid of the common or public
schools: Provided, That any lands or minerals disposed of contrary l^uure tat afeto the provisions of this Act shall be forfeited to the United Stattes %ghZt£SuL *° pNh
by appropriate proceedings instituted by the Attorney General for
that purpose in the United States district court for the district in
which the property or some part thereof is located.
(c) That any lands included within the limits of existing reser- m j ^ ^ S S S , eet£
vations of or by the United States, or specifically reserved for water- ©*ciuded.
power purposes, or included in any pending suit or proceedings in
the courts of the United States, or subject to or included in any
valid application, claim, or right initiated or held under any of the
existing laws of the United States, unless or until such application,
claim, or right is relinquished or canceled, and all lands in th0 d*££*. ***** **"
Territory of Alaska; are excluded from the provisions of this Act.
SEO. 2. That nothmg herein contained is intended or shall be held d e?^t£r 0fctc
^tS wor construed to increase, diminish, or affect the rights of States under Jjggjgf*
"' ***
grants other than for the support of common or public schools by
numbered school sections in place, and this Act shall not apply tp
indemnity or lieu selections or exchanges or the right hereafter
to select indemnity for numbered school sections in place lost to
the State under the provisions1 of this or other Acts, and all existing erSJUlooiitoSdfT
m
laws governing such grants and indemnity or lieu selections and force.' °°
exchanges are hereby continued in full force and effect.
Approved, Janjuary 25,1927*

CHAP. 58.—Aa Act Making appropriations for the Treasury and Post
Office Departments for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1928, and for other
purposes.

January 26,1927.
IH.R. 14557]
[Public, No. 57ij

TITLE I—TREASURY DEPARTMENT
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled. That the following xnSt^^priJS^
sums are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the Treasury Department for the fiscal year
ending JTune>30, 1928, namely:
OFFICE OF T H E SECRETARY

Secretary* Office,

Salaries: Secretary of the Treasury, $15,000; Undersecretary of wS^ASk2?te^SS
the Treasury, $10,000; three Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury, offi« P***"*1and other personal services in the District of Columbia in accordance with thfc Classification Act of 1923, $125,000; in all, $150,000: pntho^
Provided^ That in expending appropriations or portions of apj)ro- salaried limited
to
priations contained in this Act tot the payment of personal services aSSca^o^8 under
in the District of Columbia in accordance.with the Classification vol. 42, P. 1488
Act of 1923, the average of the salaries of the total number of
persons under any grade in any bureau, office, or other appropriation
unit sh&ll not at any time exceed the average of the compensation ^ 0 , ^ 0 ^ ™ ^ ^
rates specified for the grade by such Act, and in grades in which a grade.
only one position is allocated the salary of such position shall not
exceed the average of the compensation rates for the grade, except Advance9 ln ^^^
that in unusually meritorious cases of one position in a grade ally meritorious cases.
advances may be made to rates higher than the average of the comensation rates of the grade, but not more often than once in any Restrictionnotappji.
seal year and then only to the next higher rate: Provided, That this chScai^er^.081*1^
restriction shall not apply (1) to grades 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the clericalductioninftxeC
mechanical service, or (2) to require the reduction in salary of any J^
m
person whose compensation was fixed, as of July 1, 1924, in accord*% P- W 9 °-
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[CHAPTER 149.]
AN ACT
To require the approval of the General Council of the Seminole Tribe or Nation
in case of the disposal of any tribal land.

April 27,193*
[&-R.
[H. R. 10362.1
10362.1

[Public, No. io».]

Seminole Indians,
°pisposai of tribal
provai 8 ^ 5 ^ general
counc&

Apmau**.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the
United States of America in Congress assembled. T h a t hereafter t h e
Secretary of t h e I n t e r i o r shall n o t sell, lease, encumber, o r i n a n y
m a n n e r dispose of, any land o r a n y interest i n l a n d belonging t o t h e
Seminole T r i b e o r Nation i n Oklahoma o r reserved for t h e benefit
of such tribe, except with the approval of the Seminole Tribe or
Nation acting through its general council selected in pursuance of
Seminole customs.
Approved, April 27,1932,
[CHAPTER 150J

JOINT RESOLUTION

fH. J. Bes., 375.)
y 0 p r o v ide additional appropriations for contingent expenses of the House d
^pub. Res., No. 17.J
Representatives for the fiscal year ending June 30,1932.

Resolved by the Senate and Souse of Representatives of the United
HoaseoiRepresenta- States of America in Congress assembled^ That the following sums
Additional approprf- are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
ationsjbr contingent appropriated, for contingent expenses of the House of Representatives for the fiscal year ending June 30,1932:
special and select For expenses of special and select committees authorized by the
^ ^
House, $15,000.
puroJtnie,ete.
p o r furniture and materials for repairs of the same, including
labor, tools, and machinery for furniture repair shops, $6,500.
f hwiinS*110 wport8 ^ o r s * e n °g r a pWc reports of hearings or committees other than
o Maw*
special a n d select committees, $5,000.
Approved, April 29,1932*
[CHAPTER 161.1
AN ACT
May 2,193?

[8.3570.)
{Public, No. no.)

To amend the Act entitled "An Act confirming in States and Territories title
to land granted by the United States in the aid of common or public schools/*
approved January 25, 1927.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
8c£l01} ^ t l n S United States of America in Congress assembled, That subsections
S^eraisectioS11 ° (b) and (c) of section 1 of the Act entitled "An Act confirming in
aJended!4' P ' im' States and Territoriestitle to land granted by the United States in
the aid of common or public schools, approved January 25,1927, be
amended to read as follows:
,
sow SSS iS?Jwi to " W That the additional grant made by this Act is upon the
testates.
express condition that all sales,.grants. deeds> or patents tor any
of the lands so granted shall hereafter be subject to and contain a
reservation to the State of all the coal and other minerals in the
lands so sold, granted, deeded, or patented, together with the right
to prospect ior, mine, and remove the same. The coal and other
wibjec^SJ^ta^Sale8 mineral deposits in such lands not heretofore disposed jof by the
* State shall be subject to lease by the State as the State legislature
may direct, the proceeds and rentals and royalties therefrom to be
utilized for the support or in aid of the common or public schools:
l^ituw to contra. Provided, T h a t any lands or minerals hereafter disposed of convention,
trary to the provisions of this Act shall be forfeited to the United
States by appropriate proceedings instituted by the Attorney General for that purpose in the United States district court for the district in which the property or some part thereof is located.
Ext
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"(c) That any lands included within the limits of existing reserva- i*»<fc «<****•
tions of or by the United States, or specifically reserved for waterpower purposes, or included in any pending suit or proceeding in
the courts of the United States, or subject to or included in any
valid application, claim, or rignt initiated or held under any of
the existing laws of the United States, unless or until such reservation, application, claim, or right is extinguished, relinquished, or
canceled, and all lands in the Territory of Alaska, are excluded from
the provisions of this Act."
SEC. 2. This amendatory Act shall take effect as of January 25, jyjg§!%™oi'***'
1927: and in any case in which a State has selected lieu lands since Benefits'to
states,
t
such date under the Act approved February 28, 1891 (26 Stat. TU
^SSSaSSSq
796), and still retains title thereto, such State may, within ninety ^*l$$Sfc
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, relinquish to the
United States all right, title, and interest in such lands and shall VoL H*p-imthereupon be entitled to all the benefits of the Act of January 25,
1927, as amended by this Act.
Approved, May 2, 1932.
[CHAPTER 152.J
To grant certain lands to the State of Colorado for the benefit of the Colorado
School of Mines.

May 2.1932.

IH._R.tti.)
(JPUWIC. No. ni.j

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary Colorado,
of the Interior be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to issue use o? fhe^Coteraldo
to the State of Colorado patent conveying title to the south half s^ooiofMfnes.
southeast quarter section 22; the north half northeast quarter, and the Description,
southwest quarter northwest quarter section 27, township 18 south,
range 66 west, sixth principal meridian, Colorado, for trie use and
benefit of the Colorado School of Mines located at Golden, upon
ayment to the United States of $1.25 per acre therefor: Provided, j^g80*hat there is found to be no conflicting valid claim to the lands so
described: And provided further, That there shall be reserved to the Be£J|gerBb» **•» **
United States all coal, oil, gas, or other mineral deposits found at
any time in the landj together with the right of the United States,
its grantees or permittees, to prospect for,, mine, and remove such
deposits, under such rules, regulations,'and conditions as the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe.
Approved, May 2,1932

?

[CHAPTER 153.]
AN ACT
May 2,10W
To authorize the conveyance by the United States to the State of Minnesota of • , ^ DJlc
j11-^08 .
lot 4, section 18, township 131 north, range 29 west, in the county of Morrison, i™ »No- "2.1
Minnesota,

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary p^o^am RI ie
of the Interior be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to convey Military Keservatfon*
to the State of Minnesota all right, title, and interest of the United conve^dtoStates in and to lot 4, section 18, township 131 north, range 29 west, Description.
fifth principal meridian in the county of Morrison, State of Minne- Vo1 2I p d9
sota, formerly a part of Fort Kipley military reservation and restored
- »- to homestead entry by Act of April 1, 1880 (21 Stat. L. 69) 2 for
military purposes and specifically as part of Camp Kipley Military 12serReversion for con*
Reservation. Such conveyance shall contain the express condition '
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2fa A l l to Mifnm Sty*** f r m n t B #lfaU (font*, Ofotfimg:
^t^^t__

Vfpms,

^y^k^^pZZOr^^

, ^ _ — ^ efc/f <& <£^
of the County of—^&&CJ
c*-*<^*
^ M<3>LJ C<^€^OL

^state of-r-~
of-rr-=- ^ZA^^^c
._State

z

. heretofore purchased from the

State of Utah, the lands hereinafter described, pursuant to the laws of said State in such case made and provided,
At& W\tttw, the saia\.^->^^^>^
—

.—,~.

-^^^~^£

-,.-.,r ..,-.,.- „ ,

<s?Ce^_^
^~ <^^Lik^Uc^<^

ha&paid for said lands, pursuant to the conditions of said sale, and the laws of the State duly enacted in relation
thereto, the sum ofJU^^t^^i>
/ ^ ^ / ^ ^ « - ^
JL^^HJL
ff//a J, oe)
. Dollars,
and all legal interest thereon accrued, as fully appears by the certificate of the proper officer, now on file in the office
of the Secretary of State of the State of Utah;
Hum, QUpttfor*, J, WILLIAM SPRY, Governor, in consideration of the premises, and by virtue of the power
and authority vested in me by the laws of the State of Utah, in such case made and provided, do issue this
PATENT? in the name and by the authority of the State of Utah, hereby granting and confirming unto the said
r-and to -^&

3mr$ and assigns
State aforesaid.

forever, the following piece or parcel of land, situate in the County of— £2-^g^*-*-'>1

to wit: &&L <>J ^ ^ t i ^ ^

containin^^c^^^L^^^^^

YJLtUjtifr <<£?- 13L)*\+. Jh™™

&^iUjacres

%U*^h*-('*)

<LU<&

&*^&L,

according to the said certificate

Sfo l^attt smfc to Ijolb the above described and granted premises unto the said ^ — « - ^

_•
...-, -s
*=tC^^AT^LOLTL^
and to •c-<^.
=
ftefrs and assigns forever, subject to any easement or right of way of the publit, to use all such highways as may have
been established according to law, over the same or any part thereof, and subject also to all rights of way for ditches, tunnels, and telephone and transmission lines that may have been constructed by authority of the United States.

Jtt Sfeattttumtj IMpmif. / have hereunto set my hand and caused the great seal of the State of Utah to be
hereunto affixed.
9mtr at Salt Lake City, this'

.<2fi

-—day of v

*Z- f-cf£
^ / &>-U^
i

one thousand nine hundred and <*** "ft-1 ^ - -

v. in the year of our Lord,

, and of the independence of the

United States of America the one hundred and *J%&£^-

^ IZLand in the . ?£

year of the State of Utah.
By the Governor:

/
/Socretary

//

of State.

Secretary of the (State Boi\ard of Land Commissioners.

Certificate No.

«£>•><
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Salt Lake City, Utah
July 17, 1929,
Hon* Commissioner, General Land Office,
Department of the Interior,
Washington, D. C#
Sir:
We will very much appreciate an expression of the
Departmentfs construction of the Act of January S5, 1937,
(Public 570, 69th Congress) with regard to the problem hereinafter mentioned.
This question arises in a number of cases in this
State, and without doubt in other States•
As you know, prior to the passage of the Act of
January 25, 19S7, extending the school land grant to this,
among other states, the State of Utah had sold and disposed
of—thousands- of acres of State lands#
In \9X9 our State Legislature (Chapter 107 Session
Laws ofrUtatf, .1919) enacted a law requiring that all sales of
St^te lands thereafter must contain a reservation of minerals
to the State * and providing for the lease of minerals. However,
any sales xoade by the State prior to 1919 were not subject
to a mineral-reservation -to the State*
Section 4879 of the Compiled LawB of Utah, 1917,
provides:
"After acquired title inures to prior grantee •
If any person shall hereafter convey any real
estate by conveyance purporting to convey the
same in fee simple absolute, and shall not at
the time of such conveyance have the legal
estate la such reeT Estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same, the legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to the
grantee, his heirs, successors, or assigns, suoh
conveyance shall be as valid as if such legal
estate had been in the grantor at the time of
the conveyance.ft

- 2 -

This Statute represents merely a legislative
declaration of the doctrine of estoppel by deed as securing
to the grantee the benefit of the grantorfs after acquired
title.
Under the decisions which hare been called to our
attention this doctrine appears to be binding upon States in
their transactions as well as upon individuals • The result
of the application of the doctrine would ordinarily, therefore,
result in the Testing in the State1 s prior grantee any title
which the State of Utah acquired under the act of January 25,
1927.
What then is the effect of Sub-section (b) of
Section 1 of the Act of January 85, 1937?
We do not feel that there is any reasonable interpretation of the Aot other than that sub-section (b) applies
only to sales and transfers after the passage of the Act, and
does not affect grants where the title passes from the State
by .^Lrtue of its prior patent. This view is in accordance
with-the statement in House Report 17fiI^02X Senate Bill 564,
wherein it is stated, page 3:
"The bill also requires the States to reserve and
to withhold onto themselves all minerals of rtiatsoever character, in any and all lands which tixey
shall hereafter transfer or sell* giving to them,
however-r the right to -lease the-minerals, in the
lands and to utilize the proceeds received as
rentals or royalties for the benefit of their
common or public schools•"
To hold otherwise would result in defeating to a
considerable extent the purpose of the Act of 1927, which was
to quiet title to the State lands and create some stability as
to the titles.
It would require a determination in the case
of every section sold by the State prior to 1919, without reservation, of whether~~or~ noflrthe land was-known valuable mineral land at the time of the Statefs right under the original
grant would have attached in the absence of known valuable
mineral character, which is the same question that caused so
much confusion, uncertainty and dissatisfaction as to our
state titles.

~ 3 -

In a number of instances where this State had made
s a l e s and i t was subsequently held by the Interior Department
that the lands were known valuable mineral lands under the
application of the geological inference rule and did not pass
to Utah under the original grant, the Department rendered dec i s i o n s holding that the lands passed to the Stat? of Utah
under the Act of January 35, 1927. In meting these decisions
the Department has had knowledge of the fact that the State f s
s a l e s prior to 1919 as shown by the fact that the transferees
of the State were, by the Interior Department, made parties
to the contests involving these lands*
While we do not believe that the Department w i l l
take a view different from that which we take, (i«e* f that
said sub-section (b) does not apply to transactions prior to
the Act of 1927} we have been persuaded by parties interested
i n State lands to request an expression by the Department,
i n order that these parties can f e e l secure in their t i t l e s
and in the development they may desire to undertake*
I t would be very much appreciated if we could
secure a reply at an early date*
Respectfully,
STM3E LAND BOARD CF VTAR.
By -<J*T.01droyd)
EXECUTIVE SECBETAHY.
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Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134)
Daniel A. Jensen, Esq. (5296)
Royce B. Covington, Esq. (10160)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE£ LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendants
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Post Office Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019
Telephone: (801) 532-7840

smfflsaSHL,
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, acting by and through the
SCHOOL & mSTITUTIONAL TRUST
LANDS ADMINISTRATION,
Plaintiff,
ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT
vs.
REX MORRELL MATHIS; JOANN L.
MATHIS-ROSS; WILLIAM DALE MATHIS;
MARK PICKUP; SHAWNDA PICKUP
CAVE; MATHIS LAND, INC., a Utah
corporation; BUCK CREEK, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company; MOUNTAIN
MINERAL RESOURCES, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company; and JOHN DOES 1-30,

Civil No. 050700196PR
Judge Douglas B. Thomas

Defendants.

This matter came before the court on August 30,2007, at 9:00 a.m., for oral argument on
cross motions for summary judgment. Thomas A. Mitchell and Erin M. Arnold appeared for the

plaintiff. Ronald G. Russell and Royce B. Covington appeared for defendants. The court having
reviewed the record herein and considered the arguments presented by counsel, concludes that
the plaintiffs claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Utah Code Ann,
§ 78-12-2, which provides a seven-year limitation period for the state in respect to any real
property by reason of the right or title of the state to the same. The court is of the opinion that
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Van Wagoner v> Whitmore, 199 P. 670 (Utah 1921), in
which the court held the seven-year limitations period is inapplicable to the state in an adverse
possession case, is distinguishablefromthe instant case. Here, the state made a conveyance of
the property at issue by patent and the defendants acted under color of title based on that patent
and the tax sale that flowed therefrom, for more than 70 years. In Trail Mountain Coal Co. v.
Utah Div. ofState Lands and Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court
determined that the seven-year period of Utah Code Ann, § 78-12-2 applied to a claim by the
state, and affirmed the Utah Court of Appeals* ruling that although "states are generally exempt
from the applicable statute of limitations when acting in their capacity as school land
trustees,. . . an exception to the general rule is triggered when the state itself, through its
legislature, makes the statute of limitation applicable to the state/1 Trail Mountain Coal Co. v.
Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 884 P.2d 1265,1271 (Utah App. 1994). The court having
based its ruling on the statute of limitations does not reach the issue of the validity of the patent
or the tax sale. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is denied.
2

2. Defendants' mtrtlon for summary judgment is granted.
3, The court hereby grants judgment in favor of defendants on their counterclaim and
hereby quiets title against the plaintiff to the surface of thefollowing-describedreal property (the
"Property*') in Mathis Land, Inc. and to the mineral estate of said Property in Buck Creek, LLC,
as to a one-fourth interest, and Mountain Mineral Resources, LLC, as to a three-fourths interest,
said Property being located in Carbon County, Utah and more particularly described as;
All of Section 36> Township 12 South, Range 10 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
4. The defendants are entitled to retain all payments and compensation previously
received in connection with the Property.
5. The court further decrees that the defendants are entitled to all proceeds, royalties,
and other payments with respect to the Property accordingfotheir interests as stated in the
foregoing paragraph 3. The court directs that all funds escrowed in connection with this dispute
at Chase Bank (account number 000001609120785) and Key Bank (account number
440781003775) be released in full to the defendants according to their interests as stated in the
foregoing paragraph 3.
6. The plaintiffs Amended Complaint and all claims therein are hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
7. This Order and Final Judgment resolves all claims and is entered as the final
judgment in this case.

3

DATED this <Tfth day of

^f\ft\/

,2Q07,

BY THE COURT:

M ^ * & \ ^ ^ jTlflO^

Honorable fidagjas B.Thofnas
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Thomas A, Mitchell, Esq
Attorney for Plaintiff,

RonalcKJ.fttissell,Esq.
PARR WAJDDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOM
Attorneys for Defendants
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